



Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Post-Dissolution: Adaptation Strategies, Ideological Persistence, and Reemergence in Indonesian Politics

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Abstract

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a transnational Islamic organization advocating for a global caliphate, was officially dissolved by the Indonesian government in 2017 for posing a threat to Pancasila and national sovereignty. This study examines the post-dissolution dynamics of HTI, focusing on its adaptation mechanisms and the continued influence of its caliphate discourse on Indonesia's political and social landscape. Employing critical discourse analysis through a library-based qualitative approach and content analysis of literature, the research reveals that former HTI members have shifted from formal public activities to digital platforms, informal networks, and rebranded communities to disseminate ideology and recruit members. Key adaptations include virtual da'wah, youth-targeted seminars, and capitalizing on societal grievances such as economic inequality and moral decline. Factors enabling re-emergence encompass public dissatisfaction with democracy, global transnational influences, lax digital oversight, and ideological appeal to millennials. Although lacking formal power, HTI's narrative sustains debates on the relationship between religion and the state. The study concludes that formal dissolution has not eradicated the movement but transformed it into a more resilient, underground entity. Recommendations include enhanced digital monitoring and counter-narratives, while limitations underscore the need for ethnographic studies to assess the grassroots impact.

Keywords:

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,
Caliphate Discourse,
Transnational Islamism,
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Introduction

The reform movement in Indonesia has entered its 16th year (1998-2014), with public responses varying widely, including criticisms of its implementation. Recently, some have even called for the return of the New Order era, arguing that life during that time was better compared to the current situation, which is characterized by high costs, insecurity, hardships, and numerous disasters. Politicians have leveraged this nostalgia for the New Order period to establish political parties, make electoral promises, and disseminate illusions of prosperity, justice, and public welfare, often by referencing the 1945 Constitution. In the legislative elections (Pileg) held on April 9, 2014, legislative candidates (Caleg) offered promises to their constituents that, if elected to the council, they would bring prosperity to the people, eradicate poverty, reduce unemployment, and, more ambitiously, eradicate corruption. They even pledged to provide free education and healthcare, as well as lower the prices of essential goods and services.

One of the notable phenomena of the reform era is the surge in democratic enthusiasm, which has provided space for freedom of expression through organized actions. This has led to the emergence of political parties with various ideologies, mass organizations (Ormas) with diverse orientations, and non-governmental organizations or civil society groups with various interests. Democracy, both as an ideology and a political system, has attracted attention from many parties, with hopes that it can improve the quality of life.

Democracy ensures a balance of power and catalyzes change toward a more stable society. Various civil society groups have emerged, offering changes, one of which is Hizbut Tahrir (HTI). This transnational Islamic movement proposes a more radical change in the political system, as it aims to transform Indonesia's political system into an Islamic Caliphate system, replacing the republican form of state with an Islamic state. Political systems in Islamic and Muslim-majority countries, as well as non-Islamic countries in general, adopt a Western-style democratic model that is incompatible with Islamic Sharia. In fact, according to HTI, the democratic political system is a system of disbelief (*kufir*).¹ The strategy employed to achieve this change is through *da'wah* (Islamic propagation), and HTI has developed a *da'wah* model considered effective and efficient.

¹ Abdul Qadim Zallum, *Demokrasi Sistem Kufur*, trans. M. Shidiq al-Jawi (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2009).

Therefore, the main issues addressed are what HTI's activities are after its official dissolution by the government and how HTI influences political and social discourse in Indonesia.

Method

The method used is library research, a study where data and information are collected from magazines, books, journals, documents, and other sources. The application of library research in this writing involves drawing from several books or journal references related to the traditions of the Javanese community. This research method employs a qualitative approach, where the collected data is in descriptive form. The data analysis technique used is content analysis, which involves an in-depth discussion of the content of written or printed information in mass media related to the research topic.

Brief History of Hizbut Tahrir

Hizbut Tahrir was founded by Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani in East Jerusalem in 1953. After the founder died in 1977, Abdul Qadeem Zaloom led the organization until his own passing in April 2003. Leadership then transitioned to Ata Abu-Al-Rushta, who previously served as the spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir in Jordan, and he has held this position to this day. The organization has expanded and gained followers in 58 countries, including Muslim-majority nations such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Malaysia, and Indonesia, as well as countries with Muslim minority populations like the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Canada, and the United States.

Hizbut Tahrir first appeared in Indonesia around 1982. Its arrival began with a meeting between Abdullah ibn Nuh, the leader of Pondok Pesantren al-Ghazali, and Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, a Lebanese activist who was pursuing education in Australia. Abdurrahman came to Bogor to teach at Pesantren al-Ghazali, where many of the students were university students from the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB). Subsequently, students who had understood Hizbut Tahrir's teachings took on the responsibility of introducing the organization's ideology to other student activists outside the campus who were active in the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK).²

² M. Kautsar Thariq Syah and Paelani Setia, "Radikalisme Islam: Telaah Kampanye Khilafah oleh Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Pra-Pembubaran oleh Pemerintah." *Jurnal Iman Dan Spiritualitas* 1, no. 4 (2021):

Since the Reformasi era, Hizbut Tahrir has emerged as a leading organization advocating for the establishment of a global caliphate based on Sharia law. In Indonesia, the organization is estimated to have hundreds of thousands of members, with primary support coming from students and educated professionals in major cities. Although their calls to oppose systems they deem secular-capitalist-nationalist have sparked controversy, the number of members and supporters of their ideology continues to grow. In 2001, Hizbut Tahrir added "Indonesia" to its name, becoming HTI. However, this name change was not intended to make the party autonomous or to limit its focus solely to Indonesia. They are likely the only organization in Indonesia operating as a local branch, or "province," of a broader international movement.³ On May 8, 2017, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, General (Ret.) Wiranto announced that the government, after a thorough evaluation, would take legal action to ban HTI throughout Indonesia. Wiranto explained the reasons behind the ban on the organization.⁴

One of the School Da'wah Institutes (LDS) that organized this event was the LDS in Bogor City, West Java. In Bogor itself, the activity took place at SMA IT Insantama. Representatives from LDS across Bogor City attended, with participants from 15 sub-districts enlivening the event. Based on reports from the school, it was revealed that the event received direct financial support from HTI Bogor City. Moreover, several invited speakers were figures and intellectuals from HTI's central office. Their presence aimed to motivate teenagers and students to spread the spirit of caliphate da'wah in school environments and surroundings. Additionally, participants received tips on how to invite friends or peers to join Islamic studies organized by HTI.⁵ Nasheed music performances from each LDS representative in Bogor City further enlivened the event.

The theme "We Are the Leaders of the Future" was chosen to reflect the belief of HTI youth in their readiness to live life while firmly adhering to a commitment to campaign for Sharia and the caliphate. They also presented themselves as youth who avoid negative behaviors often associated with teenagers in

523-535, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jis.v1i4.14094>.

³ Deni Junaedi, "Bendera di Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta: Kajian Konteks Sejarah, Konteks Budaya, dan Estetika Semiotis," *Jurnal Kawistara* 2, no. 3 (2012): 225-328, <http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.3938>.

⁴ Wiranto, "Langkah Hukum Diambil untuk Bubarkan HTI," Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, May 8, 2017, <https://www.kemhan.go.id/itjen/2017/05/08/wiranto-langkah-hukum-diambil-untuk-bubarkan-hti.html>.

⁵ Sarmadan, Aceng Tahmat, and Siti Gomo Attas, "Discourse of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Radicalism: A Critical Discourse Analysis on Tempo.co Media," *Getsempena English Education Journal* 9, no. 1 (2022): 1-12, <https://doi.org/10.46244/geej.v9i1.1775>.

general, which are seen as damaging to the nation's future generation. HTI believes that the moral decline in Indonesia is caused by improper or deviant youth development and education from Islamic teachings. They often highlight the prevalence of free association among Indonesian teenagers, which is viewed as tarnishing the image of Islam. Therefore, based on the authors' investigation, HTI frequently conducts campaigns and petitions to reject free association among students and learners at various campuses, such as in Bogor, Jakarta, and Bandung.⁶

The Dissolution of HTI and Its Impacts

Although Hizbut Tahrir has political objectives, the organization did not officially register itself as a political party to participate in general elections. According to its activists, the existence of many Islamic parties today only creates confusion among the Muslim community. Therefore, Hizbut Tahrir chose not to follow the path of other Islam-based parties in engaging in elections and securing seats in legislative.⁷

During the New Order era, HTI relied on informal networks to expand its influence. This strategy is commonly employed by social movements to recruit members and advocate for their goals in countries with less open political systems, thereby mitigating threats from the regime at the time. In its early development phase, HTI utilized Muslim student organizations as a means to expand its network and support. However, behind these informal networks, HTI operated a hidden organizational structure. One of the first organizations used as a platform was the Islamic Student Spirituality Board (BKIM) at the Bogor Agricultural Institute.⁸

The fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998 marked the beginning of an era of democratization and the relaxation of political controls. However, HTI needed about two years to adjust to these changes. HTI began appearing publicly in March 2002 by holding an event at Istora Senayan, Jakarta, which for the first time called for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Since then, they have actively responded to various important events, such as actions rejecting the

⁶ Muhammad Chaidherrahman, "Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan di Kota Makassar (2002-2013)," Diploma thesis, Universitas Negeri Makassar, 2015. <https://eprints.unm.ac.id/1914/>

⁷ Nidah Hayati, "Konsep Khilafah Islamiyah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Kajian Living al-Qur'an Perspektif Komunikasi," *Epistemé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman* 12, no. 1 (2017): 169-200, <https://ejournal.uinsatu.ac.id/index.php/epis/article/view/662>.

⁸ Pusat Pengkajian Strategi Tentara Nasional Indonesia, *Menghidupkan Kembali Kekhalifahan di Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Strategi Mobilisasi dan Dampaknya bagi Indonesia* (Jakarta: Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2010), 8.

Draft Law (RUU) on Mass Organizations in 2013 and condemning the holding of Miss World in Indonesia in the same year. They have also become more modern in disseminating their movement by publishing a book titled "Islamic Political Party" and launching their official website, www.hizbuttahrir.or.id, in 2004. Two years later, on June 22, 2006, HTI was officially registered as a Mass Organization (Ormas) based on Decree No. 44/D of the Directorate General of National Unity and Politics, Ministry of Home Affairs.III.2/VI/2006. Currently, the website has been blocked by the government in line with the dissolution of HTI.

On July 19, 2017, the Indonesian government revoked the legal entity status of the mass organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, officially dissolving the organization. This revocation action is an implementation of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 2 of 2017, which replaced Law Number 17 of 2013 on Mass Organizations. The government had three main reasons for dissolving Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia:

1. As a mass organization with legal entity status, HTI was deemed not to contribute constructively to the development process in realizing national ideals.
2. The activities carried out by HTI showed strong indications of opposition to the objectives, principles, and characteristics based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, as regulated in Law Number 17 of 2013 on Mass Organizations.
3. HTI's activities were considered to have caused conflicts within society that have the potential to threaten public security and order, as well as endanger national unity.⁹

After the government officially dissolved HTI and revoked its legal entity status, the organization filed a lawsuit against the dissolution letter issued by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemenkumham) to the State Administrative Court (PTUN). The judicial process at PTUN became the only legal avenue pursued by HTI to fight for the continuation of its existence. This occurred because the House of Representatives (DPR) had ratified the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) on Mass Organizations into Law Number 2 of 2017 on Mass Organizations on October 24, 2017. The ratification of the Perppu into law rendered HTI's application for judicial review of the Perppu on Mass Organizations moot.

⁹ Itok Dwi Kurniawan, "Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Ditinjau dari Perspektif Kewarganegaraan Liberal dan Kewarganegaraan Republik." *Global Citizen: Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan* 6, no. 2 (2019): 1-18, <https://doi.org/10.33061/glcz.v6i2.2547>.

Therefore, HTI's lawsuit at PTUN became the only path that had to be taken to cancel the Decree (SK) on the dissolution of HTI by the Kemenkumham. In its lawsuit, HTI requested that the implementation of SK Number AHU-30.A.01.08 of 2017, regarding the revocation of HTI's legal entity status, be suspended until a final legal decision is made. However, the decision of the Jakarta High State Administrative Court (PTTUN) upheld the dissolution of HTI. The panel of judges opined that the Decree (SK) of Kemenkumham regarding the dissolution of HTI was in accordance with applicable regulations. HTI's lawsuit was rejected because evidence showed that the organization was not aligned with Pancasila. Thus, the legal entity of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia association, which was revoked on July 19, 2017, was declared invalid and has no binding legal force, along with all its legal consequences.

Feeling dissatisfied with the decision, the HTI association filed an appeal. However, the High State Administrative Court (PTTUN) again decided that the dissolution of HTI by the Menkumham was valid. The panel of judges opined that Kemenkumham's action did not violate the contrarius actus principle, as Kemenkumham has the authority to issue state administrative decisions related to the ratification of the establishment of HTI's legal entity. Furthermore, the panel of judges stated that, based on the evidence, HTI was proven to have had the goal of replacing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, as well as changing the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) into a caliphate state.¹⁰

In response to the Jakarta High State Administrative Court's (PTTUN) decision rejecting HTI's appeal, HTI spokesperson Ismail Yusanto stated that his party would file a cassation as a form of resistance against the perceived injustice experienced by HTI. The cassation registration process at the Supreme Court was conducted by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who hoped that all parties would respect the ongoing legal proceedings.¹¹

Adaptation and New Strategies of HTI Post-Dissolution

Although the government officially dissolved HTI in 2017, this movement did not simply disappear from Indonesia's socio-religious dynamics. On the contrary, the dissolution triggered former HTI members to adapt by changing their da'wah tactics and methods of operation to remain existent despite legal

¹⁰ Faiq Hidayat, "Perjalanan Kasus HTI Hingga ke Tingkat Banding," *Detik News*, September 27, 2018, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4230868/perjalanan-kasus-hti-hingga-ke-tingkat-banding>.

¹¹ Kristian Erdianto and Sabrina Asril, "HTI Ajukan Kasasi Terkait Pencabutan Status Badan Hukum oleh Pemerintah," *Kompas.com*, October 29, 2018, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/10/29/15344451/hti-ajukan-kasasi-terkait-pencabutan-status-badan-hukum-oleh-pemerintah>.

restrictions. One of the most significant adaptations is the shift of activities from formal public spaces to the digital world. Former HTI members utilize various social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and YouTube channels to disseminate the caliphate ideology and conduct online member recruitment.¹² These activities are carried out through informal networks and online communities, using religious narratives that remain loyal to supporting the global caliphate idea. In addition to utilizing digital platforms, former HTI members also changed the image of their movement. To avoid legal action, they no longer openly use the name "Hizbut Tahrir" in various activities, preferring to use names of local da'wah communities, Islamic study institutions, or general terms such as "political tauhid studies."¹³ This image change allows the ex-HTI movement to continue interacting with society without being directly identified as part of the banned organization.



Figure 1. Webinar Activity Featuring Ust Ismail Yusanto (former HTI)¹⁴

¹² Sepri Yunarman, Nurul Fadilah, and Ali Akbarjono. "Gerakan Sosial Eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Pasca Pembubaran: Studi Kasus di Bengkulu," *Jurnal Sosiologi Nusantara* 8, no. 1 (2022): 59-84, <https://doi.org/10.33369/jsn.8.1.59-84>.

¹³ Kisno Hadi and M. Linda Sari, "Fundamentalisme Radikal dalam Pemikiran dan Gerakan Politik Keagamaan di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)," *Jurnal Ledalero* 20, no. 2 (2021): 159-173, <https://ejurnal.iftkledalero.ac.id/index.php/JLe/article/view/233/0>.

¹⁴ Yunarman et al., "Gerakan Sosial Eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia."

Since the government officially dissolved and banned all HTI da'wah activities in Indonesia, former HTI members have sought to conduct da'wah through other platforms considered safer from government surveillance. Former HTI members have realized that the current conditions in Indonesia are not safe for their community. Therefore, they prefer to engage in softer activities, making adjustments to the situation and conditions, rather than confrontational activities such as large-scale demonstrations. This is as stated by one former HTI member, whom the researcher interviewed.

"We realize that the current regime is less friendly to the Muslim community. Since being dissolved by the government, we no longer conduct demonstrations on the streets, as it would only harm us more. That is also the directive from the central leadership [...]." (Ari, Eks HTI)¹⁵

However, although former HTI members have adjusted their da'wah methods, their da'wah vision remains implemented in every activity conducted. They only switch "boats" (organizations) to convey da'wah to the Muslim community. Because da'wah is an obligation, it does not require going through the HTI organization. In fact, for them, no one can prohibit da'wah, not even the government. This is as revealed by the previous informant.

"[...] Da'wah does not have to be in HTI; there are still many other platforms to propagate Islam. The government can dissolve HTI, but it certainly cannot prohibit us from engaging in da'wah. The mission to carry out Islamic da'wah remains our duty as Muslims [...]" (Ali, Eks-HTI)¹⁶

Especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, the former HTI community continued to carry out da'wah activities in Bengkulu. However, due to government policies limiting crowds, former HTI also limited face-to-face meetings. They continued to hold seminars and public discussions by inviting national figures through Zoom meetings.

"[...] Since the government dissolved us, we continue to hold da'wah activities using new 'boats' (organizations). We host public discussions by inviting representatives from religious figures, mass organizations, and educational institutions in the region, along with materials from the center.

¹⁵ Yunarman et al., "Gerakan Sosial Eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia."

¹⁶ Yunarman.

However, since the pandemic period, all our activities are mostly virtual, not to violate government policies [...] (Ari, Eks HTI Bengkulu).¹⁷



Figure 2. Da'wah Bulletin Shared via WA¹⁸

After being dissolved by the government, the former HTI community continues to propagate the comprehensive Islamic system. They even establish various communities according to the main themes of their da'wah. In economic da'wah, they establish the "MATRI" Community; in the student field, there is the "BAKORLEMDAKA" Community; in the youth field, there is the "KTP" Community, among others.

Another strategy applied is approaching youth groups and intellectuals. Former HTI members often conduct seminars, public discussions, and leadership training sessions based on Islamic political values to develop new cadres among the millennial generation.¹⁹ The young generation with critical views on the national political situation becomes one of the primary targets in the ideological regeneration efforts after the organization's dissolution. These strategies indicate that formal dissolution does not automatically end the spread of HTI's ideology.

¹⁷ Yunarman et al., "Gerakan Sosial Eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia."

¹⁸ Yunarman et al.

¹⁹ Mohammad Taufiq Rahman, Bukhori Bukhori, and Paelani Setia, "Hizbiyyah and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's New Member Recruitment Strategy After Disbandment," *Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan* 10, no. 2 (2022): 41-64. <http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v11i1.19317>.

Instead, HTI transforms into a more flexible movement, operating underground and capable of adapting to technological developments and existing social conditions.

Factors Contributing to the Reemergence of the HTI Movement

The resurgence of activities by former HTI members after dissolution cannot be separated from several fundamental factors in the social and cultural structures that support the continuity of this movement. These factors cause the caliphate ideology to have a place in society, even though the HTI organization has been officially banned.

First, dissatisfaction with national political and economic conditions creates a conducive environment for the reemergence of caliphate discourse. Social disparities, corrupt practices, and national political instability have led to widespread public dissatisfaction with the prevailing democratic system. In such situations, alternative ideologies, such as the caliphate, offer seemingly simple solutions to address the nation's complex problems, thereby attracting the attention of some segments of society.²⁰ For example, the increase in fuel prices (Pertalite/Solar) followed by surges in basic commodity prices (such as cooking oil, eggs, and meat) triggers public protests. Radical groups like the former HTI voice: "This is proof of the failure of the capitalist-democratic system! The caliphate is the solution, because its leaders are not allowed to oppress the people." And high unemployment among youth (Indonesia's open unemployment rate ±7 million people, 2023) is exploited for narratives: "Democracy only benefits the elite. In the caliphate, the state is obliged to provide jobs according to Sharia."

Second, the influence of globalization on transnational Islamic movements plays a role in maintaining the existence of HTI's ideology. Transnational movements, such as Hizbut Tahrir, continuously provide discourse, ideology, and movement strategies to their supporters at the local level. The spread of this ideology occurs through international online networks that are difficult to sever even if the organization at the local level has been dissolved. For example, YouTube & Telegram content from HTI cadres in Malaysia, Turkey, or the UK (e.g., the "Khilafah Channel") is shared by former HTI sympathizers in Indonesia.²¹ Moreover, Twitter/X is used for campaigns with hashtags like

²⁰ Yunarman et al., "Gerakan Sosial Eks Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia."

²¹ "Khilafah Channel dan AlwaqiyahTV, Media Aktivis Khilafah," Khilafah.id, October 7, 2021,

#KhilafahIsTheSolution followed by pro-caliphate activists from various countries.

Third, the lack of adequate supervision of the virtual world provides leeway for former HTI members to continue disseminating their narratives. The internet, social media, and instant messaging platforms have become new spaces that are not easily monitored by the state. Digital media presents significant opportunities for the production and dissemination of caliphate ideology in more covert and adaptable formats.²² For example, in encrypted Signal & WhatsApp Groups: Former HTI cadres create groups with pseudonyms (e.g., "Scientific Islamic Studies") for closed discussions. Messages are auto-deleted after being read, eliminating digital traces.

Fourth, the appeal of the caliphate ideology to the young generation, who are critical thinkers and in search of identity, is also a significant factor. The young generation, especially those active in campus environments or religious communities, tends to be more receptive to ideas offering fundamental changes to existing conditions. The attraction of the young generation to the caliphate idea is influenced not only by religious aspects but also by the desire to realize social and political changes considered more ideal. For example, Presentation of Data and "Facts" that Appear Objective. Real Example: Infographics on social media comparing "Corruption Index of Secular Countries vs. Caliphate History" with manipulated data. Academic quotes from Western scholars (e.g., "The Failure of the Nation-State" by Brendan Simms) were twisted to support caliphate arguments. Podcasts in "Book Review" format dissecting works by Noam Chomsky or Marx, then linked to "democracy's failure."

Overall, these factors suggest that although HTI has been legally dissolved, the social and political conditions in Indonesia continue to provide opportunities for similar discourses and movements to emerge and evolve, with their appearances and methods increasingly adapting to the times.

Conclusion

This study has examined the post-dissolution dynamics of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), focusing on its adaptation strategies and the persistence of its caliphate discourse within Indonesia's political and social landscape. The find-

<https://khilafah.id/khilafah-channel-dan-alwaqiyah-tv-media-aktivis-khilafah/>

²² Syarafuddin H Zainuddin and Zaki Faddad SZ. "Khilafahisis Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) melalui Dunia Digital di Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmu Agama: Mengkaji Doktrin, Pemikiran, dan Fenomena Agama* 18, no. 1 (2017): 11–18, <https://jurnal.radenfatah.ac.id/index.php/JIA/article/view/1529>.

ings reveal that, despite the government's official dissolution of HTI in 2017 due to its perceived threat to Pancasila and national sovereignty, the organization has not ceased operations but has instead transformed into a more flexible, underground movement. Former members have shifted from overt public activities to digital platforms and informal networks, utilizing social media for ideological dissemination and recruitment, while rebranding themselves under innocuous names, such as local da'wah communities. This adaptation has enabled HTI's caliphate ideology to continue influencing public discourse, particularly among young people and intellectuals, by exploiting societal dissatisfaction with democracy, economic inequalities, and moral decline. Consequently, HTI's narrative remains a contentious element in Indonesian politics, fueling debates on the interplay between religion and state without formal political power.

Based on these results, policymakers and civil society organizations should enhance digital monitoring and promote counter-narratives that emphasize inclusive Islamic interpretations aligned with democratic values. Educational institutions could integrate programs that foster critical thinking about political ideologies to mitigate the appeal of radical discourses among the younger generation. Additionally, interfaith dialogues and community-based initiatives may help address underlying grievances, such as economic disparities and corruption, that radical groups like ex-HTI exploit to gain traction.

This research is limited by its reliance on library-based methods and qualitative content analysis, which may not capture real-time grassroots activities or quantitative data on membership growth post-dissolution. Future studies could employ ethnographic approaches or surveys to assess the actual scale of HTI's influence in specific regions, or conduct comparative analyses with similar transnational movements in other Southeast Asian countries to identify broader patterns of adaptation and resilience.

Author Contribution Statement

All authors discussed the results and contributed to the preparation of the final manuscript. All authors agree to be accountable for all aspects of this work.

Statement of Interest

All authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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